(DOWNLOAD) "Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank" by United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit # eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank
- Author : United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
- Release Date : January 08, 1991
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 92 KB
Description
BECKER, Circuit Judge This appeal, set in the context of the recent crisis in the savings and loan industry, presents the important question whether and for how long a federal district court must grant a receiver of an insured depository institution a stay after its appointment, under the stay provision of the the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (""FIRREA""), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(12)(A)(ii) (West 1989). The district courts are sharply divided on the issue, and the only court of appeals to consider the provision did so only tangentially. Before grappling with this question, however, we must clear three preliminary hurdles, appellate jurisdiction, justiciability, and exhaustion of administrative remedies. We conclude, on those points: (1) that there is jurisdiction over this appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949); (2) that the instant controversy is not moot, despite the passing of the 90 days during which the receiver claims that it was entitled to a stay and even though the underlying action has settled, because the issue is ""capable of repetition, yet evading review,"" see Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 71 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1982); and (3) that for all practical purposes, Praxis exhausted its administrative remedies. On the merits, we hold that if the receiver of a depository institution makes its request under section 1821(d)(12)(A)(ii) within 90 days of its appointment, the district court then must stay the litigation until those 90 days after appointment have expired. That is, the district court has no discretion to decline a section 1821(d)(12) stay request based on alleged irreparable harm to other parties, but the court should not grant a section 1821(d)(12) stay lasting beyond 90 days after the receiver's appointment.